Category Archives: Trustee

October 26, 2015

Take Time Upon Termination

by Rebecca Klock Schroer

When a trust terminates, beneficiaries are understandably anxious to receive final distributions.  They often do not understand that there is a period of time after a trust terminates to allow the trustee to wind up the administration. 

For example, we recently represented the trustee of a very old trust that terminated on a date certain.  Upon termination, the remaining trust assets were to be distributed among many remainder beneficiaries.  After receiving several phone calls, we quickly learned that the beneficiaries expected to receive final checks on the termination date.  We explained that, as with all trust administrations, the trustee had to take several steps before issuing checks for the final distributions.

First, the trustee must complete a final accounting that separates income and principal.  This is necessary to determine the final distributions, particularly if the income beneficiaries are different from the remainder beneficiaries.  Next, the final expenses need to be estimated, so that the expenses can be prepaid or a reserve can be held back for future payment.  These expenses might include preparation of the final tax return, trustee fees and attorney fees. 

In Colorado, there is a statute that helps limit liability of a trustee that has issued a final accounting.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-16-307 provides that a proceeding against a trustee must be commenced within six months of receipt of a final accounting showing that the trust is terminating. 

For additional security, the trustee often wants to obtain a release from each beneficiary prior to making the final distributions.  Otherwise, the trustee runs the risk of distributing the trust assets and having no assets remaining to defend a lawsuit.  If the beneficiaries refuse to grant releases, the trustee may want to seek judicial approval of the final accounting before making the final distributions. 

The law provides that the trustee may take a reasonable amount of time to wind up the trust administration. See § 1010 of Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees. In our experience, this can take from sixty days to several months or even longer depending on the facts and circumstances.  While it is understandable that beneficiaries are anxious to receive their distributions, they have to allow the trustee to properly finalize the trust administration.

September 1, 2015

The Uniform Trust Code — A Time for Colorado

by Carol Warnick

The Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) has now been adopted in 31 states.  It is now the law in significantly more states than the Uniform Probate Code.  The UTC is a uniform law drafted by the Uniform Law Commissioners, over a seven-year period.  It is the first comprehensive uniform act dealing with trusts, although several states, notably California, Georgia, Indiana and Texas, all had comprehensive trust statutes at the time.  These statutes, as well as any existing trust statutes in other states, were reviewed by the committee drafting the UTC.  The stated goal of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) when drafting the model act was to “provide States with precise, comprehensive, and easily accessible guidance on trust law questions.”  The impetus behind the model trust act was the growing use of trusts throughout the country, which coupled with the sparse body of trust law in many states, created significant issues for lawyers and courts trying to deal with trust disputes. 

I practice trust and estate law in three states, Colorado, Utah and Wyoming.  Both Utah and Wyoming have adopted the UTC.  I find that it is so much easier to deal with and solve trust disputes in both Utah and Wyoming because of the provisions of the UTC.  One reason is that the law is set forth much more clearly and gives judges ready authority to back their decisions.  In my experience, bringing a statute to the attention of the court carries more weight than finding a case that is close to “on-point” in the dispute, if finding such a case is even possible.  Because the law is set forth more clearly, everyone going into a dispute knows what the law is.  There is not a significant body of trust common law in any of the states I practice in, therefore the UTC brings significantly more uniformity to the decisions of the variety of judges who have to rule on trust issues. 

In addition, there are innovative portions of the UTC that provide more options to trust beneficiaries and potential litigants when issues arise with respect to a given trust.  One example of such innovation are non-judicial settlement agreements.  The UTC specifically provides that parties may enter into binding non-judicial settlement agreements to resolve issues concerning trusts as long as the agreement doesn’t violate a material purpose of the trust and includes terms and conditions that could be properly approved by a court under the UTC or other applicable law.   Examples of matters that can be approved by a non-judicial settlement agreement would be the interpretation or construction of terms of the trust, approval of a trustee’s report or accounting, direction to the trustee to refrain from performing a particular act or to grant the trustee a necessary or desirable power, resignation and appointment of a trustee and determination of trustee compensation, transferring the trust’s principal place of administration, and the liability of a trustee for an action relating to the trust.  Any interested person can also seek court approval of the agreement, but in my experience working with non-judicial settlement agreements in Utah and Wyoming, no one has felt the need to obtain court approval after the negotiation of such an agreement.   Such flexibility allows the interested persons with regard to a trust (defined as those whose consent would be required to achieve a binding settlement if it were to be approved by the court) to collaborate and work out a variety of issues that would otherwise require the additional time and expense of obtaining court approval for such actions.  I have found this option to be invaluable in working out trust issues for clients, especially when the size of the trust does not justify significant court involvement, and often brings about settlement more readily. 

Much to the chagrin of many estate planners, the UTC was defeated in Colorado over a decade ago but is again being studied by a committee at the Colorado Bar Association.  Each state legislature has the ability to adjust the model act and modify it as seems appropriate to reflect local preferences, so there is hope that the model act can be adjusted in such a way that it can be passed next year.  I want to lend my voice of support to the adoption of the UTC in Colorado as an act that would greatly facilitate the ability to solve trust disputes early, more readily, and with less expense. 

August 17, 2015

Colorado Court of Appeals Limits Settlor’s Ability to Exercise Retained Power of Substitution

by Helen Rogers

A recent Colorado Court of Appeals decision suggests that a settlor who retains the power to substitute assets into an intentionally defective irrevocable trust (an “IDIT”) may be prevented from substituting a promissory note into the IDIT, even if the settlor retained the right to substitute assets into the IDIT without the supervision of a fiduciary. The decision, along with the District Court order that it upholds, suggests that a settlor’s retained right to substitute assets into an IDIT is more limited than the settlor might imagine or hope.

In In the Matter of the Trust Created by Mark Vance Condiotti, 14CA0969 (unpublished decision), a settlor established an IDIT (the “Condiotti Trust”) for the benefit of his son. The trust agreement gave the settlor the right to reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other property of an “equivalent value.” The agreement stated that the settlor could exercise this power in a nonfiduciary capacity, without the approval or consent of any person acting in a fiduciary capacity. This “substitution power,” also referred to as a “swap power,” is often included in IDITs because it causes the IDIT to be treated as a grantor trust for income tax purposes but does not cause the IDIT’s assets to be included in the settlor’s estate for estate tax purposes. When an IDIT is treated as a grantor trust, the settlor may pay the income taxes for the IDIT without incurring any gift taxes (thus increasing the value of the trust gift tax-free).

After funding the trust with a diversified portfolio of securities, the settlor notified the trustees of the Condiotti Trust that he intended to reacquire the entire corpus of the Trust in exchange for a promissory note. The promissory note had a face value equal to the value of the Condiotti Trust’s securities, and paid interest at the Applicable Federal Rate.

The trustees refused to accept the promissory note in exchange for the securities. The settlor threatened to sue. The trustees petitioned the District Court of La Plata County, where the trust was then administered, for instructions.

In their petition for instructions, the trustees argued that they could reject the promissory note because the trust agreement only permitted the settlor to substitute assets of equivalent value, and the promissory note did not have a value equivalent to the Trust’s securities because (1) it was unsecured, (2) it bore interest at a low rate, and (3) there was little market for promissory notes. They also argued that the settlor’s proposed substitution was actually a request for a loan from the Condiotti Trust to the settlor, which was not permitted by the trust agreement.

The settlor argued that the promissory note did have a value equal to that of the Condiotti Trust’s assets because it had a face value equal to the value of the trust’s securities, and, under Section 7872 of the Internal Revenue Code, a promissory note is valued at its face value as long as it pays interest at the Applicable Federal Rate and the Settlor is solvent.

The District Court issued an order stating that the trustees were entitled to reject the proposed substitution. First, it stated that, in the context of an asset substitution involving an IDIT, assets will be considered to be of equivalent value if they have (1) an equivalent value under the Internal Revenue Code, AND (2) an equivalent fair market value. As the settlor’s promissory note bore interest at a low rate and there is little market for reselling promissory notes, the District Court found that the note did not have an equivalent fair market value to the Condiotti Trust’s more liquid diversified securities.

Second, the District Court held that the trustees could reject the proposed substitution because it was in fact a request for a loan from the Trust to the settlor, which was not permitted under the trust agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s finding that the proposed substitution was a request for a loan from the Trust to the settlor. The Court provided four questions for courts to consider when determining whether a particular transaction is a loan: (1) do the parties stand in the relationship of debtor and creditor; (2) was a promissory note executed; (3) was interested agreed to or paid; and (4) did the parties agree that the recipient would repay the monies received?

The Court of Appeals did not address the District Court’s finding that the note was not of equivalent value to the trust’s assets.

What does this case mean for settlors who wish to exercise their retained powers of substitution?

First, a settlor should ensure that his or her proposed substitution transaction does not appear to be a loan, especially where the trust agreement does not allow the trust to make loans to the settlor. In fact, the Court of Appeals’ four questions suggest that a settlor should never attempt to substitute a promissory note for trust assets. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a substitution of a promissory note into a trust does not result in (1) a debtor-creditor relationship between the settlor and the trust, (2) an executed promissory note, (3) agreed-to interest, and (4) an agreement that the settlor would repay the trust.

Second, any settlor who exercises his or her power of substitution should ensure that the asset being substituted into the trust is truly of equivalent value to the assets being taken out of the trust. The District Court’s Order indicates that a trustee may scrutinize both the tax value and the fair market value of any asset that a settlor proposes to substitute into a trust, and that the trustee may reject a substitution if it determines that either of those values is too low. Additionally, the settlor risks rejection if the property being substituted into the trust could not be resold to the same extent as the property being removed from the trust.

July 21, 2015

Opposition to the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act

by Morgan Wiener

Despite the final version being passed by the Uniform Law Commission two years ago, the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (“UFADAA”) has not yet enjoyed widespread passage by state legislatures.  According to the Uniform Law Commission, to date, UFADAA has only been enacted in one state – Delaware.  An additional 26 states introduced legislation to enact a version of UFADAA during the first half of this year, but none of those measures have been passed.  As tempting as it may be to lay the blame on the sluggish pace of the legislative process, it’s important to note that UFADAA also faces substantive resistance.

Although much of the commentary surrounding UFADAA, both on this blog and in the estate planning community at large, has been positive, industry and consumer groups have both opposed the act on privacy grounds.  For example, letters published by both Yahoo! and a coalition of civil liberties groups have raised concerns that the relatively unfettered access to digital assets allowed by UFADAA goes too far and does not do enough to protect the privacy interests of not only a decedent, but also those who communicated with a decedent during his lifetime.  These letters can be found here and here.  The Internet Coalition, a group that represents the interests of major e-commerce and social media companies, the State Privacy and Security Coalition, Inc., and NetChoice, a group whose goal is to promote e-commerce, have all also opposed UFADAA’s enactment in various states.

NetChoice has gone further than simply opposing UFADAA and has proposed its own alternative to UFADAA – the Privacy Expectation Afterlife and Choices Act (“PEAC”).  Rather than providing automatic access to a decedent’s digital assets, PEAC contemplates that the probate court will grant access only upon making certain findings and contains a number of provisions that appear designed to protect the holders of digital assets.  You can read the full text of PEAC here.

It will be interesting to see whether UFADAA gains more traction during the next legislative session or whether the opposition holds firm.  Watch this space for updates.

June 24, 2015

Updates for fiduciaries from the IRS and Colorado

by Kelly Cooper

The IRS has stated that it will not issue closing letters for federal estate tax returns filed on or after June 1, 2015, unless one is requested by the taxpayer. The information provided by the IRS states that the taxpayer should wait at least four months after filing the return to request a closing letter. A closing letter indicates that the estate’s federal estate tax liabilities have been paid. While a closing letter is not a formal closing agreement, many fiduciaries wish to have a closing letter from the IRS before making final distributions and closing estates. For returns filed prior to June 1, 2015, please refer to the following document for guidance as to when a closing letter will be issued:

Frequently Asked Questions on Estate Taxes

Certain statutes in the Colorado Probate Code are subject to cost of living adjustments each year. The numbers for 2010-2015 can viewed here:

Cost of Living Adjustment of Certain Dollar Amounts for Property of Estates in Probate

May 12, 2015

What Does It Mean To Be A Trustee?

by Carol Warnick

We are constantly surprised to realize that the normal, average trustee who is not a professional fiduciary doesn’t really understand what is required of him or her and often makes serious mistakes.  You would expect that someone taking over the role of being a trustee would inquire or do some type of research as to what is expected, but unfortunately many new trustees don’t seem to take the responsibility seriously enough, often with disastrous consequences.

The trustee stands in a special relationship with the grantor of the trust as well as to the beneficiaries.  This relationship is unique and the trustee should keep that in the forefront of his or her mind.  By appointing someone as trustee, the grantor is depending upon the trustee to both honor the provisions of the trust to the best of his or her ability, but also to respond to the needs  of the beneficiaries and to maintain their confidence and trust.  The trustee must be careful not to do anything which would benefit the trustee to the detriment of the beneficiaries or to ignore the duties and obligations of a trustee.  Thus the word “trust” inside the term “trustee” should not be taken lightly. 

The obligations of a trustee are defined not only by the trust agreement, but also by state law, some of which is statutory and some of which is common law.  State laws may differ from state to state, but some basic premises hold true wherever  a trust is being administered.  In general, these duties of a trustee are important and can result in litigation, removal, and potentially surcharge if the trustee ignores them.  

Some of the general duties of a trustee are set forth below, as taken from “What It Means to Be A Trustee:  A Guide for Clients,” published in the ACTEC Journal, Volume 31, No. 1, Summer 2005. 

  • Duty to Administer Trust by Its Terms.  The trust, including amendments,  provides a roadmap for the trustee and unless its terms are ambiguous, the trustee must follow its terms.  As mentioned above, state law will govern many areas where the trust is silent, so the trustee must be versed in the state law where the jurisdiction is administered. 
  • Duty of Skill and Care.  Skill, prudence and diligence — this is a high standard of performance — higher that one would be expected to follow if administering one’s own assets. 
  • Duty to Give Notice.  The trustee must be familiar with the language of the trust as well as state law to determine when he or she must give notice to beneficiaries, or perhaps a co-trustee.  Some examples requiring notice to certain individuals are resignation, delegation or designation of a successor trustee, rights of beneficiaries to withdraw principal at certain times, the naming of a professional investment advisor, of delegation of the investment function.
  • Duty to Furnish Information and to Communicate.  The trustee must keep the beneficiaries informed about the administration of the trust.  This may include information about investment performance, actions of the trustee or anything else reasonably requested by the beneficiary. 
  • Duty to Account.  The laws of most states require that the beneficiaries be given regular accountings reflecting the liabilities, receipts and disbursements of the trust.  The form and frequency varies from state to state or the language of the trust document. 
  • Duty Not to Delegate.  Generally, the trustee has the duty not to delegate acts requiring judgment and discretion (typically the trustee was chosen because he or she exhibited good judgment and sound exercise of discretion) unless specifically given that authority in the trust document or by statute.  The trustee may hire agents such as attorneys, accountants, investment advisors, etc. but the trustee should not blindly follow their advice.  The exception to that would be a Directed Trust, which is beyond the scope of this article
  • Duty of Loyalty.  The trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.
  • Duty to Avoid Conflict of Interest.  The trustee should not use trust property for personal gain and should not use the trust assets in a manner that benefits the trustee personally.  The exception to this is when self-dealing provisions are written into the trust for the benefit of trustees who are also beneficiaries of the trust.  Even if such provisions are present, a trustee needs to be especially careful of self-dealing transactions and should consider appointing an independent trustee (if the trust or state law allows it) strictly for the purpose of authorizing such transactions. 
  • Duty to Segregate Trust Property.  The trustee must not co-mingle personal funds or any other non-trust funds with the assets of the trust.
  • Duty of Impartiality.  The trustee must treat all the beneficiaries impartially unless the trust itself instructs otherwise.  This becomes complicated when the trustee must balance the interests of the income beneficiaries with the interests of the remainder beneficiaries of a trust. 
  • Duty to Invest.  The trustee has a duty to invest the assets appropriately.  Unless otherwise specified, that includes a duty to diversify assets.
  • Duty to Enforce and Defend Claims.  The trustee must take reasonable steps to defend claims against the trust and to enforce claims the trust may have against others.  Part of the decision-making process in determining what is reasonable needs to be an assessment of the costs  of enforcing or defending versus the costs to the trust of not taking action on the claim.
  • Duty of Confidentiality.  The affairs of the trust should be kept confidential except with those who are by law “interested persons” such as the beneficiaries and co-trustees. The trustee should not disclose to third parties the identify or interests of the beneficiaries or the nature of trust assets, unless requested to do so by a beneficiary who may need certain information disclosed to a third party.  This duty of confidentiality also extends to personal things about beneficiaries that may come to the knowledge of the trustee in the process of administering the trust.

Any trustee paying close attention to the duties listed above will stand a much better chance of making the trustee experience a positive one and will be much more likely to avoid problems or lawsuits from beneficiaries. 

February 2, 2015

Trustees Take Heed: Arizona Adopts the Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege

by Kelly Cooper

For trustees in Colorado, the question remains to what extent does the attorney-client privilege offer protection from disclosure of confidential communications between trustees and their attorneys in litigation with beneficiaries.  Despite the uncertainty in Colorado, several states and the U.S. Supreme Court have weighed in on this question and Arizona is the latest state to adopt the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.  Hammerman v. The Northern Trust Company, 329 P.3d 1055 (Ariz. App. June 3, 2014).

The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that a trustee’s attorney-client privilege “extends to all legal advice sought in the trustee’s personal capacity for purposes of self-protection.”  However, the Court also held that the trustee had an “obligation to disclose to Hammerman [beneficiary]  all attorney-client communications that occurred in its fiduciary capacity on matters of administration of the trust.”

These standards will inevitably give rise to many questions depending on the facts and circumstances of the trust administration at issue, but one will likely come up over and over again.  At what point will a trustee be permitted to seek advice for self-protection.  Is a question from a beneficiary enough?  Does a lawsuit have to be filed?  A demand letter sent?  Can the trustee use trust funds to pay for the advice?

In a departure from other courts, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the trustee’s attorney-client privilege does not end merely because the advice was paid for out of trust funds.  (For example, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the source of payment for fees is “highly relevant” in identifying who is the “real client.”  United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011).  The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the source of payment was a ““significant factor… [and] a strong indication of precisely who the real clients were.”  Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch. 1976).)

Without any clear guidance in Colorado, it is important for trustees (and their counsel) to keep a close watch on future developments. 

October 27, 2014

Principal and Income Allocations — Attention to Detail

by Carol Warnick

I recently had the occasion to pull out some old CLE materials from 2001 after Colorado’s adoption of the New Uniform Principal and Income Act (UPIA).  That caused me to reflect on what has happened in the thirteen years since passage of the act in Colorado.  Unfortunately, there still seem to be individual trustees as well as attorneys and accountants who do not appreciate that the provisions of this act must be considered in determining such basic things as what is income and what is principal, unless that is clearly spelled out in the document.

Determinations of income and principal, in conjunction with the distribution provisions of the document, are critical to determining what each trust beneficiary is to receive.  The basic thrust of the UPIA is that the document will trump the UPIA rules, but the UPIA provides a set of default rules to make such determination if the trust is silent.  It also contains special rules for such things as depreciation expense, how to handle receipts from depleting assets such as mineral interests, and giving the trustee the power to adjust between income and principal under certain circumstances.     

A common mistake is to allocate principal and income based upon a recollection of what the UPIA says, or worse, how it was allocated for a previous client.  The first thing the trustee should do is to read the trust document because if the issue is discussed there, there is no need to look further.  However, most documents don’t go into the level of specificity in all areas as the UPIA does and therefore the practitioner must rely on the UPIA.  It is also important to read the correct state’s UPIA statutes as states have varied in their adoption of portions of the original uniform law.  Depreciation, for example, is one area that is treated differently by a variety of states. 

More and more trusts are spanning multiple generations and require trustees to manage trust assets for decades.  It is important to remember that a decision made today may be reviewed years later with 20/20 hindsight, when the cost of the trustee’s decision will have been compounding for years.  This means that decisions involving even low dollar amounts now can be subject to close scrutiny years later.  Trustees and their agents need to be fully aware of the provisions of the UPIA and make sure to follow them. 

October 7, 2014

The Fall of Colorado’s Same Sex Marriage Ban

By Kelly Cooper

Starting on Monday, marriage licenses were issued in Colorado to couples regardless of sexual orientation.

This change came because the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear cases from Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin.  What do these five states have in common?  Each of them had banned same sex marriage and had those bans declared unconstitutional by a U.S. Court of Appeals. 

In refusing to hear these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld three U.S. Courts of Appeal’s decisions declaring the same sex marriage bans unconstitutional and making same sex marriages legal in Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. 

The impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear these cases has reached far beyond the borders of those five states.  This is because every state in the U.S. is subject to the decisions made by one U.S. Court of Appeals.  For example, Colorado is situated in the 10th Circuit and the 10th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals declared Utah’s ban on same sex marriage unconstitutional.  Since Utah and Colorado are both bound by 10th Circuit’s decisions, it is likely that Colorado’s same sex marriage ban would also be declared unconstitutional by the 10th Circuit.  As a result, various county clerks began issuing marriage licenses to same sex couples in Colorado.

Current status: There are 19 states that permit same sex marriages plus the District of Columbia.  Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision not to hear these cases, five more states’ bans on same sex marriage will fall bringing the total number of states permitting same sex marriage to 24.  Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, an additional six states’ same sex marriage bans are effectively overruled, including Colorado’s.  The other five states are Wyoming, Kansas, North Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia.  This will bring the total number of states allowing same sex marriage to 30.

 We can expect more developments and changes in this area in the near term, so stay tuned.

September 29, 2014

Directed Trustees

by Rebecca Klock Schroer

Colorado recently enacted a set of statutes regarding directed trustees, with an effective date of August 6, 2014.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-16-801 et. seq.   A directed trustee arrangement allows for the division of obligations and liabilities between two or more fiduciaries. 

There are many circumstances where a directed trustee arrangement could be beneficial.  For example, a settlor could appoint a corporate trustee as trustee of a trust and appoint a family member or other individual as a trust advisor to make certain decisions.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-16-803 lists possible duties and powers of a trust advisor and includes:

(a) The exercise of a specific power or the performance of a specific duty or function that would normally be performed by a trustee;

(b) The direction of a trustee’s actions regarding all investment decisions or one or more specific investment decisions; or

(c) The direction of a trustee’s actions relating to one or more specific non-investment decisions, including the exercise of discretion to make distributions to beneficiaries.

The trust advisor can make decisions regarding specific issues, such as investments or distributions, while the corporate trustee retains the remaining obligations of a trustee. 

It is important for estate planners to consider the directed trustee statutes when drafting estate planning documents.  The statutes provide primarily default rules that can be altered by the provisions of a governing instrument.   For example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-16-804 provides that the provisions of a trust governing removal of a trustee will also govern the removal of a trust advisor. 

A directed trustee arrangement is different than trustee delegation and different than the relationship between co-trustees.  When a trustee delegates duties to others, the trustee has a duty to monitor and is potentially liable for the actions of the person to whom the trustee has delegated.  A co-trustee retains liability for all trustee duties and also potential liability for the actions of a co-trustee.  Under a directed trustee arrangement, a trust advisor can take on certain duties and the trustee does not have a duty to monitor or any liability for the actions of the trust advisor.  In addition, the trustee and trust advisor have a duty to inform each other only to the extent necessary to fulfill their duties.  This arrangement makes it much easier for corporate trustees to enter into a trustee/trust advisor relationship without having to worry as much about liability.

Hopefully the flexibility and clarity of the directed trustee statutes will encourage more trusts to be administered in Colorado.